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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ing guidelines by the Supreme Court.9 2 If the practical effect of such an
order is found to permit an overwhelming number of small-claim con-
sumer actions, judicial economy may well be served by congressional
treatment which would permit an appeal of the dismissal of the class
action as of right. It is more likely that the judicial machinery could
overcome the difficulties inherent in managing a large class of consumers,
than it could cope with the alternative host of individual actions. If,
however, such individual actions are not maintainable, then dismissal of
the consumer class action should have sufficient finality to fall within the
scope of section 1291,9 thus allowing the necessary judicial review of the
district court determination.
S. KENNON SCOTT
VENUE, THE HOME OWNERS LOAN ACT, AND
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
The Supreme Court in 1939 defined venue as the place where a court
may exercise its power to adjudicate a cause of action.' Thus, after a court
determines that it has the power to adjudicate, it must apply the rules of
venue to determine whether it may properly exercise that power.2 The
federal venue requirements, as enacted by Congress and interpreted by
the courts, are intended to provide a convenient forum for the parties and
to prevent actions from being litigated at a distance from the residences
of the necessary witnesses or from the defendant's residence.3 One of the
uSee Korn v. Franchard, 443 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring).
"Alternatively the importance of the order dismissing a class action may merit con-
gressional treatment similar to that in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970). Note 74 supra. The
Supreme Court has noted that the exceptions to the requirement of finality which are found
in section 1292(a)
seem plainly to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to effec-
tually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, con-
sequence. When the pressure rises to a point that influences Congress,
legislative remedies are enacted.
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955) (footnote omitted).
'Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939). See generally 1
W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 80 (2d ed. 1960); 1
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.140 (2d ed. 1964).
2308 U.S. at 168.
31n Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 163 F. Supp. 218, 223 (N.D. Ind.
1958), the court stated the following:
Generally venue relates to the convenience of the parties and affords a
defendant some protection against the threat of being forced to defend an
action at a place far removed from his residence.
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venue provisions, section 139 1(e)4 of title 28, states that if the defendant
is an agency of the United States, it is amenable to suit in the district
court of plaintiff's residence when there is no real property involved in
the action. Another provision, section 1391(c) of title 28, permits actions
against a corporation in any judicial district in which the corporation is
licensed to do business or is doing business.
In Masterson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,' plain-
tiffs, private citizens of New York, brought suit against First Federal
for an alleged conversion of personal property.7 First Federal was a
savings and loan corporation with its stock owned entirely by its
depositors.8 It was organized and chartered'under federal law and
had its sole place of business in Connecticut.' Plaintiffs, however,
brought the action in the Eastern District of New York, maintaining
that venue was properly laid in their place of residence rather than
defendant's, because for purposes of section 1391(e), a federal
savings and loan association was an agent of the United States.,'
It was also argued that First Federal was licensed to do business
in the Eastern District of New York and therefore venue was proper
under section 1391(c)." The district court, finding these arguments
insufficient, dismissed the complaint on defendant's motion. 2 This deci-
sion is of significance to out-of-state persons contemplating suits against
federal savings and loan associations, because it implies that in actions
against associations involving personal property, venue will be proper
128 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970) provides:
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of
the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or
under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in
which: (I) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action
arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the
plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.
528 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970) provides:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes.
653 F.R.D. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
'Plaintiffs in Masterson alleged that defendant had converted personal property consis-
ting of the furnishings of a summer house on which defendant had foreclosed. Brief for
Plaintiff at 3.
853 F.R.D. at 314.
Old.
'Old. Section 1391(e) also permits civil actions to be brought where the cause of action
arose. Note 4 supra. The cause of action in Masterson arose in Connecticut, where the
mortgage payments on the foreclosed property were to have been made.
"53 F.R.D. at 314. Note 5 supra.
"53 F.R.D. at 314.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
only in the judicial district of the association's home office. 3
Since no real property was involved in Masterson, the question was
whether First Federal was an agency of the United States for purposes
of section 1391(e).' 4 It was argued that the Home Owners' Loan Act of
193315 established the relationship between First Federal and the United
States as one of agency for purposes of venue. The Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933 authorizes the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereinafter
the Board) to organize and charter federal savings and loan associations.'
The Secretary of the Treasury may employ these associations as fiscal
agents of the United States. 7 Plaintiffs argued that the Board's power to
organize federal savings and loan associations and the federal govern-
ment's ability to utilize the associations as fiscal agents established an
agency relationship between First Federal and the United States.
The district court, however, determined that no such agency relation-
ship existed.'" Since the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 does not define
"agency of the United States" for purposes of venue, the court referred
to section 451 of title 28, which contains the definition of agency for
purposes of the venue provisions .2 The term "agency", as contemplated
by title 28, includes only those "corporation[s] in which the United States
has a proprietary interest .... "I'
'31d. If real property is involved, the action may be brought where that property is
situated. Note 4 supra.
'128 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1970).
'12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (1970).
1612 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970) reads in part:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people
may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes,
the Board is authorized . . . to provide for the organization, incorpora-
tion, examination, operation, and regulation of associations . . . and to
issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices
of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States.
U712 U.S.C. § 1464(k) (1970) provides:
When designated for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury,
any Federal savings and loan association or member of any Federal Home
Loan Bank may be employed as fiscal agent of the Government ....
1853 F.R.D. at 314.
"Id. at 314-15.
-28 U.S.C. § 451 (1970) provides in part:
The term "agency" includes any department, independent establish-
ment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the
United States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprie-
tary interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be
used in a more limited sense.
The definition of agency is "[a]s used in this title" and applies to all of title 28.28 U.S.C.
§ 451 (1970).
2228 U.S.C. § 451 (1970).
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In Acron Investments, Inc. v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corp.,2 the Ninth Circuit stated in detail the meaning of a proprietary
interest of the United States in a corporation. The phrase "corporation
in which the United States has a proprietary interest . . ."2 was held
to mean "those governmental corporations in which stock is not actually
issued, as well as those in which stock is owned by the United States. It
excludes those corporations in which the interest of the Government is
custodial or incidental."24 In Acron, the United States had once owned
all the stock in the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
although there was no stock outstanding at the time of the suit. For this
reason, the interest of the United States was considered more than "cus-
todial or incidental"2 and the corporation was held an agency of the
United States for purposes of section 451.27
The same definition of proprietary interest as applied in Acron must
be applied to the Masterson case. If the United States has a proprietary
interest in First Federal under section 451, then the association is an
agency of the United States. s First Federal, however, has outstanding
stock and it is owned entirely by its depositors. 29 The United States has
never owned any portion of the association's stock. While the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933 gives the Board the power of supervision of
-363 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 970 (1966). Acron was an action to
foreclose trust deeds.
-28 U.S.C. § 451 (1970).
2363 F.2d at 240. The court cited the Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1970), which
states: "The definitions of agency and department conform with such definitions in section
6 of the revised Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure." Id. The Acron court then
compared the definitions in title 28 to those in title 18 and found that the Reviser's Note to
18 U.S.C. § 6 (1948) states that:
The phrase "corporation in which the United States has a proprietary
interest" is intended to include those governmental corporations in which
stock is not actually issued, as well as those in which stock is owned by
the United States. It excludes those corporations in which the interest of
the Government is custodial or incidental.
The court in Acron relied on Revisers' notes to the United States Code to establish the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation as an agency of the United States. The
Supreme Court held Revisers' notes authoritative in interpreting the United States Code
in United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 81 (1949).
21363 F.2d at 240.
26id. The court stated that:
Since the control which Congress and the United States exercise over the
Corporation is clearly more than "custodial or incidental," it would ap-
pear that the Corporation fits within the definition of "agency" of 28
U.S.C. § 451 . ...
z1363 F.2d at 240.
28Note 24 supra.
2953 F.R.D. at 314.
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federal savings and loan associations, 30 this does not in itself establish
the agency relationship absent government ownership. It would appear,
therefore, that the interest of the United States in a federal savings and
loan association is merely custodial or incidental and that an association
is not an agency for purposes of venue.
There is apparently only one other case, Chase Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 3 which considered the issue
of whether a federal savings and loan association is an agency of the
United States for purposes of section 1391(e). Chase, a state-chartered
savings and loan association, sued to enjoin the Board from permitting
Liberty Federal Savings and Loan Association, a co-defendant in the
action, to establish a branch office which would compete for Chase's
business.32 The suit was dismissed, on defendants' motion, for lack of
proper jurisdiction over a suable entity.n The district court held, how-
ever, that there was an alternative ground which would require the dis-
missal of the action for improper venue under section 1391(e). Venue
was found improper in the judicial district of plaintiff's residence because
Liberty was not "an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority, or an agency of the United'States." The effect of the district
court decision in Masterson was to augment the Chase decision by specif-
ically stating that a federal savings and loan association was not an
agency of the United States for venue purposes. This resulted from the
government's lack of the requisite proprietary interest in the association's
stock."
It was also contended in Masterson, however, that venue in New York
should be sustained because First Federal was licensed to do business in
the Eastern District of New York.3 1 Section 1391(c) of title 28 allows a
3012 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970). Note 16 and accompanying text supra.




"The court stated that:
• . .28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) only applies where "each defendant is an officer
or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his
official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the
United States" (emphasis supplied). Liberty does not qualify under any
of the above-quoted language. Plaintiff has not called the court's attention
to any other section of Title 28 U.S.C.., Chapter 87, giving this court
venue over this action.
269 F. Supp. at 967. The stock in the Liberty association was owned entirely by its members,
as was that of First Federal Savings and Loan Association. See, e.g.. 53 F.R.D. 314.
153 F.R.D. at 315.
"Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970). Note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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suit to be brought against a corporation in any judicial district in which
the corporation is licensed to do business or is doing business. 8 In its
usual sense, the phrase "licensed to do business" has been construed to
mean the actual receipt by a foreign corporation of "a license, certificate,
or permit, which evidences a compliance with the laws of that state."'39
The Supreme Court has extended the meaning of licensed to do business
by subjecting a corporation to the jurisdiction of a foreign state court if
the corporation performs activities for which the foreign state requires a
license. 0
Plaintiffs in Masterson intended to show an implied license resulting
from First Federal's having taken advantage of its authorization under
section 1464(c) of title 12 to make loans secured by mortgages on real
property located within one hundred miles of the home office of the
association.4 Absent this authorization, a federal savings and loan asso-
ciation would certainly not be licensed, because its activities would be
confined entirely to its own judicial district. To determine whether an
association is licensed to do business in another state, it is necessary to
examine that state's license requirements. First Federal had not received
a license from New York to lend monies to its residents. In fact, New
York banking law does not require or even permit such a license to be
issued. 2 Furthermore, although plaintiffs' residence is within one hundred
miles of First Federal's home office,4" an assumption that a license to
IsNote 5 supra.
3'Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 163 F. Supp. 218, 220 (N.D. Ind.
1958).
1OPerkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). The following
language from Perkins indicates the Court's test:
The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign
corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just
to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are to be deter-
mined in each case. The corporate activities of a foreign corporation
which, under state statute, make it necessary for it to secure a license and
to designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served provide
a helpful but not a conclusive test.
"12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970) provides:
Such associations shall lend their funds only on the security of their sav-
ings accounts or on the security of first liens upon real property within one
hundred miles of their home office ....
12N. Y. Bank Law § 359 (McKinney 197 1) pertains to licensing of lenders and provides:
This article shall not apply to any person, co-partnership, association,
or corporation doing business under and as permitted by any other article
of this chapter or by any law of this state relating to savings and loan
associations or licensed pawnbrokers or by any law of the United States
relating to banks or trust companies.
1353 F.R.D. at 315.
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do business may be implied from the loan authorization ignores the ex-
press intent of Congress in regard to the nature of the associations. 4" An
examination of pertinent sections of the Home Owners' Loan Act of
19335 indicates this intent. Section 1464(c) implies only limited rights of
entry into other states.48 An association may be expected to enter another
state for purposes of inspecting or foreclosing on liened property, but
Congress did not intend these limited entries to constitute a license to do
business. 7
Section 1464(a) s delineates the basic policy of Congress concerning
the establishment of federal savings and loan associations. That section
authorizes the Board to establish these associations, "giving primary
consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-
financing institutions in the United States. 49
No special venue statute has been enacted which covers all civil ac-
tions involving federal savings and loan associations, but Congress has
enacted venue provisions which localize actions between savings and loan
associations and the Board." The associations may sue the Board in the
district court of the judicial district in which the home office of the
association is located."1 If an association wishes to resist an order of the
Board, or if the Board finds it necessary to enforce such an order, the
respective actions must be brought in the district court in the jurisdiction
of the home office of the association.52
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, under its congressional author-
ization to make rules respecting the associations," has also indicated its
intention to keep suits local by limiting the associations' activities in other
states.54 It is against the policy of the Board to approve the establishment
"Justice Weinstein saw the issue in Masterson as. . .whether Congress, in authorizing
federal savings and loan associations to make loans secured by mortgages on real property
located outside of their respective home states, intended either express or implied sanction-
ing of activity which could reasonably be termed the transaction of business in such states.
We conclude that no such intent was manifested.
53 F.R.D. at 315.
4512 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (1970).
"612 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970). Note 41 supra.
"7Masterson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 53 F.R.D. 313, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Note 44 supra.
"812 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970). Note 16 supra.
"12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970) (emphasis added).




512 C.F.R. part 556 (1971).
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of branch offices5 or agencies" in states other than that of the home office
of the association. The above mentioned limitations on the associations'
activities in other states have the force and effect of law-7 and show that
the associations were not intended to be "licensed to do business" for
purposes of the venue provisions.58
Although the associations are not "licensed to do business" under
section 1391(c), they might yet be subject to that section if they are
"doing business" in foreign states.5" There has been some confusion in the
case law resulting from the use of the phrase "doing business" as a test
for determining the state court's in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation and also for determining venue under section 1391 (c). 0 There
is some authority that the two tests are equivalent and that if the corpora-
tion is subject to the jurisdiction of the state where the federal court is
sitting, it should also be held to be "doing business" for purposes of
venue.8
The better view, however, appears to be that the two standards are
not consistent.8" In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 the Supreme
OId. § 556.5(b)(2) provides:
It is the Board's policy not to approve the establishment of a branch
office or a mobile facility by such an association in a State other than that
where the home office of the association is located.
5 ld. § 556.6(c) provides:
It is also the Board's policy not to approve the establishment of an
agency in a state other than that in which the home office of the associa-
tion is located.
5 Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fields, 128 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1942). See
generally Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920): United States v.
Morehead, 243 U.S. 607 (1917).
uMasterson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 F.R.D. 313, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Justice Weinstein felt that the limited entries into other states did not constitute a license
to do business:
Defendant is empowered to enter the Eastern District of New York
for limited purposes only . . . . An implied authorization to engage only
in limited activity outside the state is not a license to do business under
the venue provisions. 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(c).
Id.
5928 U.S.C. § 139 1(c) (1970). Note 5 supra.
6 Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790, 793 (N.D. Ill. 1958).
6 Kanton v. United States Plastics, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1965); Satterfield
v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); General Elec. Co. v. Central
Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
"2See Carter v. American Bus Lines, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 460 (D. Neb. 1959), in which
the court stated:
It may thus be seen that the "doing business" test is a quantitative
measure formerly used by the courts as a measure of constitutional power
and now used by Congress as the legislatively desirable test of venue when
it is desired to sue a corporation.
Id. at 470.
-326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Court abandoned "doing business" as a measure of state jurisdiction in
favor of a test which requires that a foreign corporation have only "mini-
mum contacts" with the forum state. This "minimum contacts" theory
relates to a state's desire to protect its citizens from harmful activities of
foreign corporations. If a corporation avails itself of the protection of a
state's laws, it should be held subject to that state's jurisdiction. 4
The "minimum contacts" test for jurisdiction, however, is less strict
than the "doing business" test for purposes of venue." This seems reason-
able, since the federal venue legislation was designed for the convenience
of both parties,6 not merely for the protection of the plaintiff. Since the-
venue standard is more stringent, a district court may assert its jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation and subsequently find venue improper. 7
In Masterson, the court did not discuss the basis for its jurisdiction over
First Federal but proceeded to find venue improperly laid under section
1391(c). First Federal apparently had the requisite "minimum contacts"
to be subject to the power of the New York court but was not doing
business for venue purposes.
The tests which courts have applied to determine whether a corpora-
tion is doing business for purposes of venue have been considerably more
comprehensive than "minimum contacts."" An illustrative case is
Frazier, III v. Alabama Motor Club, Inc.,6" which considered the follow-
ing factors:
the general character of the corporation, the nature and scope of
its business operations, the extent of the authorized corporate ac-
tivities conducted on its behalf within the forum district, the conti-
nuity of those activities, and its contacts within the district.,
Application of such a test to Masterson reveals First Federal's apparent
lack of activities within New York State. First Federal may own property
in New York through foreclosures on mortgages, but few other contacts
can be envisioned due to the association's limited rights of entry into New
"Id. at 319.
61Carter v. American Bus Lines, 169 F. Supp. 460 (D. Neb. 1959); Rensing v. Turner
Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. III. 1958); Bar's Leaks Western v. Pollock, 148 F.
Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp.
613 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
"'Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 163 F. Supp. 218, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
Note 3 supra.
67Note 65 supra.
"SSee, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Paragon Oil Co. v. Panama Ref. &
Petrochem. Co., 192 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
61349 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1965).
701d. at 459 (emphasis added).
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York. Furthermore, New York banking law is helpful in determining
whether a foreign savings and loan corporation is "doing business" in the
state.71 No foreign savings and loan associations may do business in the
state and such an association is not to be considered doing business
because it secures loans by mortgages on New York real property.
72
Since the rules of venue are intended for the convenience of liti-
gants,73 it is helpful to examine the 100 mile authorization7 4 from the
position of the borrower contemplating suit against a federal savings and
loan association. If a borrower is relying on the association's loan author-
ization,7 his only inconvenience in suing the association is traveling one
hundred miles or less to the district court in the jurisdiction of the associa-
tion's home office. 71 In contrast, if First Federal were considered "li-
censed to do business" or "doing business" for one hundred miles in all
directions from its home office, the association could be greatly inconve-
nienced by an amenability to suit in many judicial districts.
7 7
In Paragon Oil Co. v. Panama Refining & Petrochemical Co.," it was
stated that
the Court must consider and balance the inconveniences. It is
necessary to find that there is no imbalance of equities against the
defendant and that it is not unreasonable to force the foreign
corporation to defend an action in this jurisdiction. The principle
which has evolved is, in fact, one of fairness.
7
1
Application in Masterson of the balancing test as envisioned in Paragon
resulted in the dismissal of plaintiffs' suit.80 Subjection of defendant to
7153 F.R.D. at 316.
1
2N. Y. Bank. Law § 408 (McKinney 1971) provides:
1. No foreign corporation shall transact the business of a savings
and loan association within this state or maintain an office in the state for
the purpose of transacting such business.
2. No foreign savings and loan association shall be considered to be
doing business in this state by reason of engaging in the making, purchase,
acquisition, holding, sale, assignment, transfer, servicing, collecting and
enforcement of obligations or any interest therein secured by mortgages
upon real property located in this state, or the foreclosure of such mort-
gages. ...
73Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 163 F. Supp. 218, 223 (N.D. Ind.
1958).
7412 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1970).
751d.
7 1in Masterson, plaintiffs lived within the 100 mile radius. 53 F.R.D. at 316.
771d.
78192 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
71d. at 262.
1153 F.R.D. at 316.
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venue in New York was held to place an unduly heavy burden on First
Federal.8'
Since the rules of venue are intended for the parties' convenience,82
the result of Masterson would seem to be correct. Absent a proprietary
interest in the United States, a federal savings and loan association would
not properly seem to be an agency of the United States. The mere possi-
bility that associations may be used by the Secretary of the Treasury as
fiscal agents3 would seem insufficient to change this. Furthermore, the
local ownership of federal savings and loan associations would likewise
seem to preclude a finding of "agency."
In addition, the associations should not be considered as licensed to
do business in states other than their principal location. While authorized
to secure loans within 100 miles, clearly their activities are severely lim-
ited. To hold that such savings and loan associations are thus impliedly
licensed to do business would cause them extreme hardship. For example,
in Masterson, First Federal would be subject to suit in nine judicial
districts in seven states."4
Subjection of First Federal to venue in New York would have been
burdensome, but it was confusion concerning proper forum which re-
sulted in the dismissal of the suit. This confusion may continue until
Congress or the courts provide more specific rules of venue for actions
involving federal savings and loan associations and out-of-state plaintiffs.
The effect of Masterson will hopefully be to preclude considering a sav-
ings and loan association such as First Federal an agency of the United
States or doing business for purposes of section 1391. The proper forum
will be the judicial district of the home office of the association, unless
some other basis for venue is presented. This result is desirable, since it
will provide a convenient and reasonable forum for the primarily local
federal savings and loan associations.
JAMES G. THOMPSON
"d.
Jacobson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 163 F. Supp. 218, 223 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
-12 U.S.C. § 1464(k) (1970). Note 17 supra.
"53 F.R.D. at 316.
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ADDENDUM
A rehearing of the Bernstein case before the Fourth Circuit sitting en
banc resulted in an equally divided court. Bernstein v. Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Co., No. 14,949 (4th Cir., Apr. 24, 1972). The opinion
which was the subject of this comment was therefore withdrawn and the
order of the trial court, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stephens,
313 F. Supp. 890 (W.D. Va. 1971), upholding Nationwide's right to
rescind the insurance policy was affirmed without opinion. A dissenting
opinion was filed by Bryan, J., the author of the withdrawn opinion, in
which he was joined by Judges Sobeloff and Craven.
Judge Bryan's dissent reiterates the basis of his former opinion that
automobile liability insurance is no longer a matter of private concern,
but is one peculiarly subject to considerations of public policy. No. 14,949
at 5. The focus of the dissent is that public policy as reflected in the
applicable statutes precluded Nationwide's attempt to avoid liability to
Bernstein. It seems clear, therefore, that the dissent assumes the position
taken by the California Supreme Court in deciding Barrera v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 681-
682, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969), that the insurance business is quasi-public
in nature and, therefore, the rights and obligations of a liability insurer
cannot be determined solely on the basis of rules pertaining to private
contracts. See No. 14,949 at 11. However, the dissent fails to address,
and it is not clear, how this position is to be reconciled with present
Virginia statutes. The direct action statute, Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-380(2)
(Repl. Vol. 1970), provides that an action may be maintained only
"under the terms of the policy or contract," Id., and § 38.1-336 (Repl.
Vol. 1970) states that no recovery can be had upon a policy of insurance
when there exists clear proof of material fraud in the procurement
thereof. The comment, therefore, remains applicable to Judge Bryan's
dissent.
